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Political Determinants of State Capacity in Latin America
Abstract:
In this article, we argue that both democracy and governments’ partisanship have had a 
bearing on state capacity in Latin America. We also maintain that state capacity is a condition 
rooted in history and society: it can be built or purposefully undermined. In particular, in Latin 
America parties of the left have frequently operated to reallocate social and political clout in 
favor of underprivileged groups: the inclusion of the latter in the political process helped states 
to thwart pressures from dominant elites opposing redistribution and tax increases. These 
mobilized groups have also pushed for universal public services, as high-quality education, 
health care or public housing, which required well-functioning administrations and an 
adequate institutional capacity, thus contributing to consolidate stateness in the area. Whereas
previous qualitative studies analyzed the mechanisms that relate democracy and political 
partisanship to state capacity, we test this hypothesis quantitatively. To this end, we estimate 
the effect over time of democracy, political parties and other socio-demographic factors on a 
composite measure of stateness, obtaining supportive evidence: in particular, we find that 
higher democracy levels and left-leaning governments favored the growth of state strength in 
the area between 1975 and 2009 and discuss these findings with reference to the political 
experience of Latin America. 
In  this  article  we  argue  that  both  democracy  and
governments’ partisanship have a bearing on state  capacity in
Latin  America:  in  particular,  we  find  that  higher  democracy
levels and left-leaning governments favored the growth of state
strength in the area between 1975 and 2009. Whereas previous
qualitative  studies  have  analyzed  the  mechanisms  that  relate
democracy and political  partisanship to state capacity,  we test
this  hypothesis  quantitatively,  obtaining  supportive  evidence.
Our work is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss
the  relevant  literature,  then  define  our  main  dependent,
independent  and control  variables,  paying special  attention to
the thorny concept of state capacity.  Subsequently,  we submit
our main hypotheses and summarize the mechanisms at work.
Finally, we estimate the effect over time of democracy, political
parties  and  other  socio-demographic  factors  on  a  composite
measure of stateness; discuss these findings with reference to the
political  experience  of  Latin  America;  and  underline  our
contribution to the ongoing debate. Conclusions, as usual, wind
up the analysis.
Social  science  literature  has  mostly  considered
democracy and stateness as causally independent or it has taken
the  latter  to  be  a  precondition  for  the  former  (Wang  & Xu,
2015). The rare works analyzing the bearing of democracy on
state  capacity  generally  underscore  a  positive  association:  the
superior political accountability of democracy lowers corruption
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and  the  risk  of  property  expropriation  and  strengthens
bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, thus improving overall
state  capacity  (Adserà,  Boix  & Payne,  2003).  As  a  result  of
vigorous political competition, for instance, various non-partisan
state organs and policy reforms aimed at increasing government
efficiency were implemented in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and
Slovenia  after  their  democratic  transitions (Grzymala-Busse
2007).  In  Africa,  as  well,  democracy  has  been  empirically
associated to several components of state capacity as rule of law,
effectiveness, accountability and control of corruption (Bratton,
2008). In Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, competitive
elections  have  facilitated  state-building  by  stimulating  the
formation  of  stronger  political  parties;  a  more  vigorous  state
commitment  to  voters’  registration;  and  the  imposition  of
centralized authority over societal strongmen (Slater, 2008). In
short,  the historical influence of parliamentary democracy has
been considered to be an unusually stable predictor of both the
legal  and  fiscal  capacities  of  the  state  (Besley  and  Persson,
2009):  democracy  strengthens  stateness  by  enhancing
government  responsiveness  to  citizens;  by  facilitating  the
diffusion  of  information  between  policy-makers  and  voters
(Bueno de  Mesquita  et  al.,  2015);  and by increasing political
contestation (Wang and Xu, 2015).
The  influence  of  democracy,  however,  is  still
controversial as strong developmental states have existed under
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authoritarian regimes in Asia (for instance in Taiwan and South
Korea). In addition, the assertion that democracy strengthens the
consolidation  of  state  institutions  must  confront  the  sensible
objection  that  democracy  can  subsist  only  after  a  minimally
functional state is already in place (Carbone & Memoli, 2015).
Thus,  analyzing  African  regimes  in  the  early  1990s,  Bates
(2008)  claims  that  electoral  competition  and  state  failure  go
together since, during democratic openings, incumbents are less
secure about their tenure and rewards from predation multiply,
encouraging  domestic  conflicts  and  state  collapse.  In  new
democracies, in addition, objectionable politicians might emerge
who  view  the  new  democratic  politics  as  a  "one-time
opportunity to get rich" (Svolik, 2012). Others, finally, point at a
non-linear relationship: Charrón and Lapuente (2010) claim that
deprived countries enjoy higher ‘administrative capacity’ under
despotic  rule,  while  richer  countries  perform  better  under
democracy. Bäck and Hadenius (2008) similarly contend that the
association  between  level  of  democratization  and
’administrative  capacity’  is  negative  at  low  levels  of
democratization,  but  positive  at  higher  levels.  Administrative
capacity declines initially  as the political  system opens and a
plurality of social and political  actors undermine authoritarian
controls from above: however,  as mature  and more  stabilized
democratic regimes develop, bottom-up mechanisms of policy
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control  emerge  that  help  attain  the  highest  levels  of
administrative capacity.
In  Latin  America,  democracy  has  not  been  typically
studied as a determinant of state capacity, but rather as one of its
outcomes: thus, poor democratic conditions are often explained
as a consequence of local states weakness. Accordingly, among
the  key  determinants  of  state  capacity  scholars  mention
particular  historical  heritages;  features  such as  the  amount  of
trust  in  public  and  private  institutions;  economic  and  social
inequalities;  and  globalization (Centeno,  2009).  Cárdenas,
however,  singles out political  inequality as one of the factors
that possibly account for the extraordinarily low state capacity in
the  region,  in  conjunction  with  economic  inequality,  regional
struggles, and civil war (2010). Others maintain that democratic
rule strengthens the capacity of the state to provide citizens with
fundamental social services, by encouraging politicians to reach
the  poor  and those  more  exposed to  risk,  and these  latter  to
organize (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2008). 
Whether  and how in  Latin America state  capacity  has
been  shaped  by  democratic  rule, however,  remains  an  open
question. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), for instance, notice
that the trend toward greater democracy in the area has not been
accompanied by a similar change in state capacity, which has
remained  especially  low.  They  argue  that,  even  if  de  jure
democratic  institutions have  been established (political  rights,
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voting and checks on the executive), the political balance has
not  changed  for  the  presence  of  crucial  de  facto powers,  as
dominant  social  groups.  Likewise,  Cheibub (1998) underlines
that, from 1970 to 1990, governments’ extractive capacity has
not  been  much  stronger  in  democracies  than  in  authoritarian
regimes.  Grassi  and  Memoli  (forthcoming),  finally,  find  that
between 1995 and 2009 democracy has weakened the negative
effects  of  autocracy  on  state  capacity,  but  it  has  been
insufficient, by itself, to promote its strengthening. There are, in
short,  several  objections  to  the  view  that  democracy  always
advances  stateness:  antagonistic  electoral  competition  can
undermine a state and democratic petitions may overburden and
deteriorate  political  institutions  (Hagopian  &  Mainwaring,
2005). Rather than contributing to reinforce state institutions and
increase  their  effectiveness,  therefore,  the  acceptance  of
formally  democratic  institutions  may  actually  corrode  or
disintegrate state authority and public services.
State capacity, on the other hand, is a condition rooted in
history and society: it can be built or purposefully undermined
(Grassi & Memoli, forthcoming). In most instances, states that
achieved vigorous stateness in time did not have the necessary
ability  nor  the  right  bureaucracies to  do  so  in  the  beginning:
where a political leadership committed to growth and equality
had  reached  a  settlement  with  domestic  actors  to  define  a
common  policy  framework,  a  developmental  and  welfare-
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improving  bureaucracy  was  typically  created  to  support  it
(Haggard  & Kaufmann  2008).  In  other  cases,  a  weaker  state
capacity (the limited power to levy taxes, for instance) was the
result of the veto power exercised by powerful social groups that
successfully  resisted  increases  in  the  tax  load  (Huber  &
Stephens 2012, p. 41). Parties of the left generally operate to
reallocate social and political clout in favor of underprivileged
groups: the inclusion of the latter in the political process helps
states  to  thwart  pressures  from  dominant  elites  opposing
redistribution and tax increases.  These mobilized groups push
for  administratively  challenging  universal  public  services,  as
high-quality education,  health care or public  housing, and the
institutional  capacity  necessary  to  provide  them,  thus
contributing to consolidate stateness. Parties of the right, in turn,
often  advocate  order  and  legality,  since  crime  and  violence
jeopardize  business  investments  and  growth  and  are  usually
aimed  at  affluent  individuals.  A stronger  state,  in  addition,
allows  for  an  effective  enforcement  of  property  rights,  duly
supported  by  smoothly  functioning  legal  institutions,  and
contributes to restrain widespread corruption. Where established
safeguards  of  this  kind  are  absent,  insecurity  and
unpredictability  arise,  which  endanger  new  investments,  the
creation of jobs and the development of business (Fukuyama,
2007). 
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Finally,  electoral  competition  crucially  interacts  with
ideological  preference.  When  election  results  are  uncertain,
regardless of ideological orientation,  parties may be driven to
embark on policies that they might otherwise ignore, for the sole
purpose  of  gaining  or  retaining  power  (Haggard  & Kaufman
2008,  p.  360).  Policies  may  be  endorsed  to  capture  the
independent voter at the center and will be more moderate, or
reformist,  than  the ideological  position of  each party implies.
Consequently, left-wing and right-wing executives may become
more similar: the former cannot support their favorite policy of
welfare state extension because of budget limitations; the latter
cannot  adopt  their  favorite  policy  of  cutbacks  because  their
constituencies have become attached to welfare state programs
(Schumacher  &  Vis  2009).  To  sum  up,  the  contribution  of
political  partisanship  to  the  construction  of  state  capacity  in
Latin America is a question that demands an empirical answer.
State Capacity
State capacity is a thorny concept, arduous to define and
operationalize: in fact, there is greater scholarly agreement on
key  features  of  the  state  than  on how to  operationalize  such
features or the concept of the state itself  (Carbone 2013, p. 6).
In  the  last  few  years,  however,  political  scientists  and
sociologists have engaged in an extensive and critical  debate:
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while failing to yield a common position, the ongoing discussion
suggests points of convergence (see the special issues of Studies
in Comparative International Development,  2008; and Revista
de Ciencia Política, 2012).1 Definitions of state capacity often
rest on the ability of state institutions to effectively implement
official  goals  (Sikkink,  1991).  This  approach  solves  a  first
significant problem, namely the normative definition of what the
state ought to do or how it ought to do it, and underlines the fact
that  capable  states  may organize  the  economy and society  in
different ways. Thus, in the aftermath of the neoliberal cutbacks
in  state  intervention  and  bureaucracy  in  Latin  America,  one
should be able to avoid confounding minimal but capable states
as  Chile  with  essentially  weaker  states.  A second  recurring
theme has to do with Mann’s “infrastructural power” concept,
that is “the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or
not,  to  penetrate  its  territories  and  logistically  implement
decisions” (2008). Mann’s contribution underlines “the question
of the state’s authority over territory” and “whether governments
can implement policies, including the provision of public goods”
(Fortin, 2010, p. 656). In short, the infrastructural power of the
state may be read as the ability to translate policy choices into
outcomes. In addition, many authors also typically indicate state
capacity through at least one of three constituent elements: the
ability of a state to impose a degree of internal political order, by
way of  an  exclusive  control  over  the  means of  coercion;  the
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proper  workings  of  a  basic  administrative  apparatus;  and the
capacity to extract revenue from its citizens.2 
Weber famously defined the state in terms of its coercive
capacity,  based  on  the  monopoly  of  the  legitimate  use  of
physical  force  within  its  territory  (Weber,  1978).  Imposing
political  order  requires  a  state  to  secure  its  frontiers,  defend
domestic  order  and  apply  laws  and  policies  by  restraining
violence,  i.e.  to  control  the  territory by both suppressing and
preventing  internal  conflict  and  defending  the  borders  from
external invasion. A basic administrative apparatus is working
properly when a professional and insulated bureaucracy is able
to  plan  and  develop  policies  and  deliver  public  goods  and
services,  which  implies  technical  skills,  competent  civil
servants,  limited public  corruption,  and an effective influence
across state territory.  Extractive capacity,  finally,  indicates the
ability of the state to extract resources from society, mainly in
the form of tax and implies a series of critical competences and
skills: instruments to access population; means to assemble and
organize complex information; the possibility to count on law-
abiding civil servants; and ways of assuring popular compliance
with tax policies (Hanson & Sigman, 2013, p. 4).3
The  operationalization  of  state  capacity  has  also  been
controversial,  but  some  points  of  convergence  are  also
discernible.  Most agree that any single variable  is unlikely to
adequately capture its multidimensional nature (Hendrix, 2010,
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p.  283).  Composite  indexes  of  the  concept  should also  avoid
incorporating  potential  causes,  as  lack  of  democracy,  or
expected  consequences,  as  humanitarian  disasters  (Gutiérrez,
2011; Mata & Ziaja, 2009; Soifer, 2012). Finally, the ideal data
should be based on time-series cross-national measurements of
stateness  that  ensure  wide-ranging  geographic  and  temporal
coverage, enabling researchers to take advantage of variations
across space and time. Based on these reflections, we decided to
use  the  State  Capacity  Dataset  (1960-2010)  elaborated  by
Jonathan Hanson and Rachel Sigman (2013), which covers up to
174 countries for the period 1960-2010. The dataset rests on the
three  main  components  examined  above:  coercive,
administrative and extractive capacities, which are measured in
turn by 24 main indicators. By way of latent variable analysis,
finally,  the authors identify a series of underlying factors that
signify overall state capacity. 
More  precisely,  coercive  capacity  is  indicated  by  four
sets of data, beginning with military personnel and expenditures.
Yet,  a  sizeable  military  force  may  signify  war  or  domestic
insecurity,  both  of  which  lessen  state  capacity.  Consequently
additional data has been added, as the extent to which the state
has  a  monopoly  on  the  use  of  force;  is  directly  involved  in
committing violence; or is present in the territory, by looking for
instance  at  the  extent  to  which  land  is  mountainous  and
therefore arduous to reach. Administrative capacity is evaluated
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also  based  on  four  groups  of  data:  the  ICRG  (International
Country Risk Guide) Bureaucratic Quality Index; an assessment
of census frequency, which denotes both the capacity to gather
data and effective territorial control; measurements of contract
intensive  money,  which stand for  the  state  capacity  to  police
economic exchange; and an additional series of indexes related
to administrative capacity and civil service value, such as the
Weberianness  Index  elaborated  by  Rauch  and  Evans  (2000).
Extractive capacity, finally, is initially measured by tax revenues
as a percentage of GDP. In order to distinguish between policy
choices and extractive  capacity,  however,  additional  measures
were  added,  as  the  ratio  of  tax  revenues  originating  from
income,  domestic  consumption  and property  taxes  relative  to
revenue coming from international trade, as custom duties. The
higher  the  proportion  of  the  former,  which  require  a  more
structured  bureaucratic  apparatus,  the  greater  is  the  expected
level  of  extractive  (and  administrative)  capacity  of  the  state.
Other indicators, finally, show the link between actual revenue
collection  and the  expected  tax  yield,  given GDP per  capita,
mineral production, exports and additional relevant factors.
Independent and control variables 
We decided to use a minimalist notion of democracy to
avoid merging attributes of political authority and state qualities
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(as  capacity),  since  our  objective  is  to  disentangle  this
relationship.  Our  procedural  definition  is  based  on  universal
suffrage;  free,  transparent  and  competitive  elections;  and  the
defense  of  crucial  civil  and  political  rights  (along  with  the
presence  of  alternative  sources  of  information).  Formal
democratic  institutions  must  also  be  sovereign  (Dahl,  1989).
Consequently, democracies do not comprise hybrid or ‘electoral
authoritarian’ regimes, since these do not convene free and fair
elections,  an essential  requirement of this type of government
(Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Democracies, finally,
may also be imperfect and incomplete: ‘defective’ democracies
only  partially  safeguard  political  rights  (Merkel,  2001);
‘illiberal’ democracies inadequately protect civil rights and the
rule of law (Zakaria, 1997); and ‘delegative’ democracies  are
insufficiently responsive to citizen choices, poorly constrained
by government agencies and not respectful of the rule of law
(O'Donnell,  1994).  To measure democracy, we resorted to the
Polity IV data, on a scale that runs from -10 (full autocracy) to
+10  (full  democracy):  the  curators  of  the  Polity  IV  dataset
distinguish  among  ‘autocratic  regimes’;  ‘anocracies’;  and
‘democracies’. ‘Anocracy’ is a term used to describe a regime
type  that  is  characterized  by  inherent  qualities  of  political
instability and ineffectiveness, as well as an "incoherent mix of
democratic  and  autocratic  traits  and  practices."  (Marshall  &
Cole,  2014).  These  regimes  are  further  differentiated  among
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‘closed’ and ‘open’ varieties:  the  former  are  characterized by
Polity  IV values  comprised  between  -5  and  0;  the  latter  by
values  ranging  from  1  to  5.  Values  of  6,  or  larger,  denote
democratic regimes, while values included between -10 and -6
identify autocratic regimes.4
Democracy impacts stateness by reducing violence and
corruption  and  increasing  administrative  efficacy.  It  lowers
violent  conflict  by  offering  institutionalized  communication
channels with political adversaries, by incorporating them into
the  debate  and  by  yielding  to  some  of  their  petitions.5 By
making the government accountable, citizens are more likely to
identify with democracy and the state and have fewer reasons
for violent opposition. Independent civil society groups monitor
and  assess  state  functioning  and  cooperate  with  the  state  to
recommend  new  policy  ideas.  Finally,  by  making  elected
officials  and  administrators  responsible,  democratic  processes
and  sanctions  restrain  incompetence,  arbitrariness  and  the
diffusion  of  bribery  (Carbone,  2013).  We  do  not  rule  out,
however, that the relationship between democracy and stateness
may  assume  a  non-linear  form:  as  recalled  above  (Bäck  &
Hadenius, 2008), different political regimes may have a diverse
impact on stateness.
We  classified  Latin  American  parties  based  on  a
left/center-left  versus  right/center-right  dichotomy,  as  in  the
more  industrialized  countries,  following  the  categorization
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suggested by Coppedge (1997; Huber et al. 2012 for an update).6
Coppedge made use of experts who classified parties, along this
dimension, into left; center-left; center; center-right; right; and
personalist.  Accordingly,  parties  of  the  right  (for  instance,
Brazilian  ARENA)  attracted  the  successors  of  nineteenth
century  traditional  elites;  fascists  and  neo-fascists;  and  the
conservative  military  (Coppedge,  1997,  p.  8).  Center-right
parties (Argentine UCD) “targeted middle- or lower-class voters
in  addition  to  elite  voters,  by  stressing  cooperation  with  the
private sector, public order, clean government, morality, or the
priority of growth over distribution” (Ibid.). Coppedge classified
as  centrist  (Argentine  UCR)  parties  that  “stressed  classic
political liberalism, the rule of law, human rights, or democracy,
without a salient social or economic agenda”. Among them are
“governing  parties  whose  policies  are  so  divided  between
positions  both  to  the  left  and  to  the  right  of  center  that  no
orientation  that  is  mostly  consistent  between  elections  is
discernible” (Ibid.).  Changing  partisan  orientation,  center-left
parties  (Venezuelan  Acción  Democrática)  “stress  justice,
equality, social mobility, or the complementarity of distribution
and accumulation in a way intended not to alienate middle or
upper-class voters” (Coppedge 1997, p. 9). Left parties (Partido
Socialista  de  Chile;  Communist  parties)  “employ  Marxist
ideology or rhetoric and stress the priority of distribution over
accumulation  and/or  the  exploitation  of  the  working class  by
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capitalists  and imperialists  and advocate  a  strong role  for the
state  to  correct  social  and  economic  injustices”. (Ibid.:  10).7
Finally, parties are catalogued as personalist (Peruvian Cambio
90 or Bolivian Movimiento al  Socialismo) if they “base their
primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy of their
leader rather than on any principles or platforms, which are too
vague or inconsistent to permit a plausible classification of the
party in any other way" (Ibid.). We use a continuous variable to
measure  the  partisan  orientation  of  governments  (Executive
Partisan  Balance,  EPB) during democratic  periods.8  When the
values of EPB increase, the ideological leaning of the Executive
moves right (Huber et al., 2012). We also account for the fact
that state capacity needs time in order to change. 
Scholars’ opinions (and the  available  evidence) on the
role  of  partisanship  in  shaping  state  capacity  are  mixed.
Incumbency  of  left  parties  is  central  for  welfare  state
development  according  to  comparative  historical  evidence
(Huber  &  Stephens,  2012).  More  recently,  in  line  with  their
major political objectives, Left governments have made efforts
towards extending democracy and citizens’ rights, restoring state
capacity,  freeing  while  regulating  markets,  and  building  a
satisfactory  technical  and  political  environment  for  skilled
policymaking (Bresser-Pereira, 2001). Other investigations link
vigorous mass mobilization and left-party rule to the progress of
infrastructurally  accomplished  welfare  states.  However,
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alternative  studies point  at  the  consolidation  of  state  capacity
under  right-leaning  executives  (Fukuyama  &  Colby,  2011;
Rangel,  2005)  or  to  a  process  of  ideological  convergence  by
major political parties and governments that blurs partisan and
policy differences (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2008). As a result, we
leave an initial answer to this issue to our empirical analysis.
Our  model  is  completed  by  a  number  of  control
variables.  To  start  with,  we  suggest  that  past  levels  of  state
capacity have a bearing on current stateness levels. It has been
argued (and extensively recognized) that state capacity is path
dependent and varies slowly: critical junctures in the past place
institutional  arrangements  on  paths  or  trajectories,  which  are
then very difficult to alter (Centeno, 2009; Soifer, 2012). Actual
degrees  of  state  strength  are  therefore  strongly  affected  by
previous  ones:  consequently,  we  added  a  stateness  difference
variable  calculated  on  stateness  values  prevailing  15  years
earlier.9 We also added political  controls:  democratic  duration
and  presidentialism.  We  believe  that  democratic  duration  is
associated  with  stateness,  since  time  allows  democratic
institutions and practices to get established and to take root;  is
necessary for democratic norms to develop and have an impact;
and  may  encourage  more  participation  and  influence  for
deprived groups not only through parties, but also through the
development of civil society and nongovernmental organisations
(Nelson, 2007, p. 89), all of which  aid the completion of state
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consolidation.10 Presidentialism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  usually
thought of as a direct and effective way to govern and a weaker
form  of  veto  power  in  the  political  process,  compared  to
parliamentarism (Huber and Stephens, 2001, p. 55).  Since we
expect political systems characterized by stronger veto points in
the  policy  process  to  slow  down  the  expansion  of  stateness
during the period of observation, we believe that presidentalism
should have the opposite effect. 
In order to test a possible spurious relationship between
our  main  variables  we also  incorporate  levels  and growth of
economic  development:  in  fact,  both  state  capacity  and
democratic  governments  might  be  the  upshot  of  economic
development over time. A host of authors argue in favor of an
independent effect of economic development on state capacity.
Pellegrini  and  Gerlagh  vindicate  that  wealth  fosters  state
capacity, since richer countries may afford better institutions and
administrative  structures  and  many  factors  associated  with
affluence,  as  levels  of  urbanization or  schooling,  lessen  the
social acceptance of corruption (2008, p. 250). Saylor contends
that the quest for private profit is a potent state building cause:
when  pursuing  profit  during  booms,  export-oriented  actors
repeatedly  strive  for  new  state-supplied  public  goods,  whose
delivery  encourages  the  expansion  of  state  capacity  (2012).
Inequality  is  one  of  the  major  problems  faced  by  the  Latin
American  subcontinent:  while  poverty  has  been  alleviated  in
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recent years, inequality has proven more difficult to overcome.
Higher  inequality  has  been  associated  with  lower  stateness:
historians Engerman and Sokoloff  contend that  inequality has
been detrimental to the emergence of legal and fiscal capacity in
Latin  America  (2002).  Cárdenas  and  Tuzemen  also  find  that
higher levels of income inequality lead to lower investments in
state capacity (2010, p. 1-45). 
Large oil rents (whenever both the state and democracy
are not yet solid) deteriorate state capacity because they exempt
the  state  from establishing an  efficient  tax  collection  system.
Thus, in these countries, governments tend to be unaccountable
to the general population and people, in turn, are less likely to
demand accountability and political representation. Oil wealth,
in  addition,  fuels  patronage,  which  dilute  demands  for
representation and accountability  (Karl,  2004).11 Where ethnic
fractionalization  is  high,  elected  governments  must  strike  a
balance between insertion of minority groups and protection of
governing effectiveness (Ben-Meir, 2006); citizens have usually
lower confidence in political institutions; and democracy is less
likely  to  become  established  (Sojo,  2011).  Accordingly,  it  is
reasonable  to  link  high  fractionalization  to  lower  stateness.12
Larger territories, finally, may also prove challenging to govern,
since  (ceteris  paribus)  vertical  integration  and  horizontal
coordination become more demanding (Herbst & Mills, 2006).
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Data, methods, findings’ illustration and discussion
We chose Latin America to ensure comparability within a
most  similar  research  design:  the  subcontinent,  in  addition,
represents an ideal testing ground for our main hypotheses, the
bearing of political  dimensions on state  strength.  In this area,
democracies  are  plentiful  and  differ  in  quality  (unlike,  for
instance, the Middle East), while local parties’ ideologies may
be  sorted along a  right-to-left  continuum which  meaningfully
structures  politics  and  political  struggle  (as  opposed,  for
instance,  to  the  political  beliefs  of  most  African  and  Asian
parties). Political views that cause stable and intelligible policy
choices,  in  fact,  even  if  less  easily  discernible  than  in  the
developed  West,  are  crucial  for  an  enquiry  on  the  potential
connections  between  political  parties  acting  in  a  democracy,
partisanship and state capacity,  and justifies the choice of the
subcontinent to assess our research questions. 
Our  analysis  embraces  all  Latin  American  countries,
observed between 1960 and 2009: we originally considered 26
countries in total,  14 belonging to Central  America and 12 to
South  America.  Missing  data  problems  forced  us  to  exclude
seven of them from our final report.13  Our analysis is based on a
pooled  cross-sectional  time-series.  The  advantage  of
longitudinal  panel  information,  compared  to  cross  sectional
information,  consists in its potential  for an analysis of social,
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political  and  economic  dynamics  at  different  levels.  We
employed  different  random  effects  longitudinal  regression
models on a long unbalanced panel dataset, using the software
STATA.14 
We  begin  with  a  descriptive  analysis  of  the  trend  of
stateness (Fig. 1). During the period of observation (1960-2009),
our  measure  of  state  capacity  has  increased  everywhere,
especially  in  countries  where  the  quality  of  democratic
governments has been intermediate  to  strong and the  left  has
exercised  power  for  significant  periods  of  time,  as  in  Chile,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Brazil and Costa Rica. However,
equal or slightly less prominent increases in state strength have
also  occurred  where  governments  were  controlled  equally  by
left and right parties, as in Panama, or mostly by parties of the
right, as in Colombia and Guatemala. In addition, left executives
have played a role where state capacity has increased the least,
as in Guyana, Jamaica or Venezuela, countries characterized by
diverse levels of democratic quality. In short, no clear indication
on the possible links between stateness, democracy and political
partisanship comes from a reading of these data alone. 
This impression is strengthened by a graphic assessment
of the way stateness has changed over time in specific countries:
in Chile the authoritarian Pinochet era (1973-1990) is associated
with  an  increase  in  stateness,  especially  until  1981  (Fig.  2).
Democracy  further  intensifies  state  capacity,  but  the  more
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prominent  rise  occurs  under  moderate  Christian  democratic
presidents  (1990-2000)  rather  than  under  their  progressive
colleagues  within  the  Concertación alliance  (2000-2010).  In
Uruguay the military period (1973-1985) also corresponds to an
increase in stateness, which is maintained and enhanced by the
following  democratic  governments,  led  by  centrist  and
conservative Colorado and Blanco presidents (1985-2005): their
contribution to state capacity is difficult to distinguish from that
of the Frente Amplio (Fig. 3). In other cases, as in Paraguay, the
growth of state capacity coincides with the authoritarian rule of
General  Stroessner,  especially  between 1960 and 1981,  while
democratic  governments  (under  the  guide  of  the  conservative
Colorados)  were not able,  at  least  until  2009, to  improve the
stateness scores reached in 1981 by the tyrant (Fig. 4). In the
case of Venezuela, finally, improvements of state capacity were
experience both under conservative and progressive democratic
governments, as with Copei (Comité de Organización Política
Electoral  Independiente)  president  Caldera  between 1969 and
1974 and MVR (Movimiento V [Quinta] República) president
Chàvez between 2002 and 2009 (Fig.  5).  Again,  it  is hard to
discern a clear-cut pattern emerging from this information.
A more refined investigation is in order.  In  Tab. 1 we
analyze 3 models: in the first two, we focus separately on levels
of democracy and the impact of executives’ ideological leanings,
along  with  control  variables.  Subsequently,  we  estimate  the
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aggregate bearing of these variables on the dependent variable.
Specifically, in the first model we regress the indicator of state
capacity  against  levels  of  democracy (in  linear  and quadratic
forms) controlling for context variables: a lagged (fifteen years)
stateness variable;  a measure of democratic duration (again in
linear  and  quadratic  forms);  level  of  economic  development;
economic  growth  over  the  previous  5  years;  oil  rents;  Gini
values; form of government and ethnic fractionalization. Results
show that democratic quality (but not democratic duration) has
contributed to strengthen stateness in the area between 1975 and
2009  (Rsq=0.667).  In  the  second  model,  we  insert  executive
partisanship  which  shows  a  curvilinear  association  with
stateness:  moving  from  left  to  right  governments,  stateness
increases first  and then declines,  as expected (Rsq=0.647).  In
model  3,  finally,  we  incorporate  levels  of  democracy  and
executive  partisanship  along  with  our  control  variables  and
observe that our main results are confirmed (Rsq=0.674). More
precisely, authoritarian governments and both closed and open
anocracies are associated with negative stateness:  however, as
political regimes get freer and more effective, approaching the
threshold of democracy in the Polity IV scale (value 16 in Fig.
6), the impact on stateness becomes positive.
Our  main  findings  suggest  that  democratizing  always
benefits  stateness:  however,  the  impact  of  regimes  becomes
positive  only  when  a  significant  level  of  political  opening is
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reached. Democracy fosters an efficient state through a series of
mechanisms that reduce violent conflict and establish forms of
steering  and  control  from  below,  as  a  free  press  and  an
independent  civil  society;   by  way  of  instruments  of  policy
control  that  promote  administrative  capacity;  and  by
institutionalized  procedures  and  incentives  that  reinforce  the
accountability structure. Yet, democratic institutions must be put
in place and be effective. Empirical results fit our predictions on
executive  partisanship  as  well  (Fig.  7).  Moving  from  left
executives  (points  0  and  1)  to  executives  of  the  center-left
(points 2 and 3) the impact of partisanship proves positive but
decreasing. Under center right and right executives (points from
4 to  7)  the  impact  becomes  negative,  but  the  relationship  is
statistically significant only for right-wing executives.15 In short,
not only we confirmed the expected causal direction, but also
determined  that  the  effects  of  our  independent  variables
developed at values identifying relevant qualitative conditions:
democratic governments in the Polity IV scale and left and left-
leaning governments in Coppedge’s taxonomy (Figures 6 and 7).
In addition, state capacity at 15 years shows significant
and positive, meaning that earlier stateness levels have a bearing
on current  levels.  Both  economic  development  and economic
growth have a positive sway on stateness, as expected, while oil
rents  display  a  positive  sign,  against  predictions:  instead  of
smothering political representation and weakening tax collection
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as the prevailing theories anticipate, oil proceeds appear to have
stimulated stateness in the area (especially in Brazil,  Mexico,
Venezuela, and Colombia) possibly through public investments,
expenditures and the overall contribution to economic wealth, or
else  these  positive  effects  have  been  stronger  than  those
classically  underlined  by  the  literature.  Presidential  regimes,
finally, look more favorable to state capacity that parliamentary
ones,  as  foreseen,  while  democratic  duration,  ethnic
fractionalization  and  Gini  values  fail  to  reach  statistical
significance. 
In short, the argument presented here is that democracy
and  left  governments  promote  the  limitation  of  social  and
economic prerogatives,  thus contributing to a strengthening of
state  capacity.  The  adoption  and  implementation  of
governments’ policies face constraints, including policy capture
by powerful social factions and opposition by organized interest
groups. Democratic regimes with good development outcomes
attempt to surmount such limitations by engaging citizens more
actively with the purpose of building the needed consensus for
state  policies:  such  participation  improves  the  capacity  to
allocate resources more equally and effectively and reduces the
costs involved in policy enforcement. Thus, the recognition of
the right to question policies and make petitions has been crucial
to  the  strategies  of  state  capacity  building in  Latin  American
democratic  regimes.  Whereas  democracies  offer  chances  for
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participation  and contestation  in  the  policy  process,  however,
redistributive results cannot be taken for granted: it is through
the decisive involvement of left governments that the mismatch
between political and social powers has been drastically reduced
and  state  strength  has  increased  in  the  area.  This  argument
emphasizes the importance of reallocating social  and political
power  in  favor  of  subordinate  groups  so  as  to  construct
bureaucratic  capacities  that  reinforce  both  growth  and
redistribution and defeat pressures from privileged strata, which
repeatedly  defy  redistributive  policies.  Social  transfers  are  a
vital component of such agreements. 
Accordingly, the states usually classified by the literature
as the most capable in the region have tended to coincide with
the  most  vigorous  democracies,  as  Costa  Rica  and  Uruguay,
along  with  Chile  and  Argentina  (Cárdenas,  2010;  Centeno,
2009).  In  the  first  three,  progressive  parties  intent  on
redistribution  were  crucial  in  the  process  of  welfare  state
building (Grassi,  2014).  More generally,  redistributive politics
have  been  more  inclusive  when  rural-urban  alliances that
included  a  large  part  of  the  working  poor  have  been  struck,
permitting to expand welfare rights to  most citizens.  In  these
countries,  progressive  political  parties  have  promoted  the
adoption of social rights, and groups have connected with the
state  as  rights-bearing  citizens  rather  than  clients.  Disputed
elections, sometimes leading to alternation in power, encouraged
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these parties to maintain their social movement features, which
in turn showed crucial for upholding sympathetic links with the
poor.  In  addition,  at  the  end  of  the  1990s,  a  ‘new  left’ has
appeared in the subcontinent, which assumed the essential tenets
of  market  economics,  while  approving  reforms  such  as  the
enactment  of  welfare  plans  for  the  underprivileged;  a  new
concern for public safety; a more dynamic role for the state as
overseer and arbitrator between capital and labor; the expansion
and improvement of public services; and the introduction of a
more progressive tax system (Barrett et al. 2008, 22). 
Our  conclusions  are  partly  in  line  with,  and  partly
supplement, the scant literature on these issues. We developed
the only previous analysis on this topic in Latin America (Grassi
& Memoli, forthcoming) suggesting that, over extended periods
of time,  democracy has played a  greater role  than  previously
acknowledged:  from  1975  to  2009  democratic  governments,
compared to autocracies and anocracies, did contribute to make
stateness  more  robust.  We  also  confirmed  the  impact  of
executives’ partisanship, showing in greater detail the bearing of
different  political  leanings on state  capacity.  Previous authors
had  argued  that  the  weakness  of  the  state  in  Latin  America
depended  on  pervasive  economic  inequality:  economic
inequality, however, is also a reflection of left parties’ weakness,
and we illustrated the mechanisms relating these parties to state
capacity (Cárdenas, 2010). For Haggard and Kaufmann (2008),
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democracy may fortify the state by endorsing more progressive
social welfare schemes. In the region, in turn, more progressive
social  welfare systems have been linked to the existence of a
stronger left: left governments have more forcefully sponsored
redistributive welfare and checked the intentional boycotting of
critical  state  powers,  such  as  tax  extraction,  which  infringed
upon the privileges of local elites (Grassi, 2014). 
Tab. 1 Here
The case of Chile may help illustrate the argument. The
left-leaning governments led by presidents Lagos (2000-2006)
and  Bachelet  (2006-2010)  deeply  reformed  education,  public
health,   social security and pensions, greatly enhancing social
assistance for Chile’s poorest citizens; approved a series of laws
on  integrity  (2003)  and  transparency  (2009) in  the  Public
Administration; diminished the number of civil servants directly
chosen by the Executive; and inaugurated a Senior Management
Service  System,  whose  access  was  regulated  by  competitive
public exams, making civil service careers more professional. In
2005,  a  reform  also  enhanced  the  Constitutional  Tribunal’s
autonomy and jurisdiction regarding the constitutionality of laws
and administrative  acts,  making it  one  of  the  most  powerful
tribunal  in  the  world,  able  to  stop  governments’ decrees  and
protect  citizens’ rights  against  powerful  private  groups.  The
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armed  forces’  special  privileges  over  elected  politicians,  in
addition, were drastically cut (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010).16 
One of the most important social reforms promoted by
left governments in Chile was president Lagos’ Plan de Acceso
Universal con Garantías Explícitas (Regime of Explicit Health
Guarantees Plan), also labelled ‘Plano AUGE’ from its acronym.
The  plan  intended  to  further  the  quality  and  accessibility  of
public sector health services, especially for the least advantaged,
by  supplying  universal  medical  assistance  to  people  meeting
certain  age  requirements  and  suffering  from one  of  a  set  of
itemized  diseases  (initially  25,  currently  80).  In  addition  it
established new standards for both the quality and quantity of
the services provided: these constituted a specific social right to
which all  citizens  were  entitled and that  the  state  guaranteed
both legally and financially. The law also set maximum waiting
times for the delivery of medical treatment and ensured that the
required procedures and technologies were offered by qualified
health professionals (Missoni & Solimano 2010). This reform,
finally,  was  supplemented  by  an  information  system  and  by
specific analyses to evaluate compliance monitoring and impact
assessment.  To  sum up,  a  series  of  institutions  and practices
were  organized  and reinforced,  which  have  been  customarily
related to capable states.
Our  claim  does  not  imply  that  right  governments  are
unable  to  strengthen  state  capacity.  In  the  last  decades,  state
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capacity  has  increased  under  right  governments in  Colombia
(see  Fig.  1).  While  the  extent  of  their  achievements  remains
unclear  (Feldmann,  2012),  right  executives  helped  to  rebuild
domestic order by curbing both political and common violence.
Following  Uribe’s  peace  talks  with  the  AUC,  quite  a  few
paramilitary leaders have been imprisoned and a dozen major
commanders  have  been  extradited  to  the  United  States:
authorities initiated a  demilitarization process that  turned into
the  dissolution  of  an  intimidating  armed  force.  In  addition,
homicides have dropped from about 28,000 in 2002 to 15,000 in
2010, while tax extraction capacity has increased from 10.9 per
cent of GDP in 1990 to 17.8 per cent of GDP in 2009, reaching a
top of 18.2 per cent in 2006 (Gómez Sabaini & Jiménez 2012, p.
13).17 In 2004, lastly, a civil service law ended five years of legal
uncertainty, in which provisional selections affected 38 percent
of personnel, introducing new merit based criteria for admission
(Grindle, 2010, p. 22). In short, right governments were able to
expand overall state capacity by fortifying domestic order and
developing other key stateness dimensions.
  
   
Conclusions
Our  investigation  set  up  to  determine  the  impact  of
democracy  and  political  partisanship  on  stateness  in  Latin
America  between  1975  and  2009.  We  found  that  democracy
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does  propel  state  capacity:  while  the  progressive  opening  of
political  regimes contributed to  lessen  the  negative  impact  of
autocracies and anocracies, only democratic regimes exercised a
positive  bearing  on  stateness.  In  a  similar  manner,  our
hypothesis  on  the  effects  of  the  partisan  composition  of
government  was  proven  correct:  only  left  and  left  leaning
governments  were  found  to  have  a  positive  and  significant
impact, while other executives did not show a discernible trend,
except for the most conservative governments which did play a
negative  role.  The  almost  perfect  fit  between  our  empirical
findings  and the  expected outcomes greatly  strengthens  these
conclusions, which can be enunciated not only in quantitative
and relative terms, but also qualitatively with reference to the
concepts of democratic regimes, on the one hand, and left and
left-leaning executives on the other.
Although  operating  at  times  as  self-interested  actors,
Latin  American  parties  and  governments  pursue  objectives
which are valued by their electoral bases and that differentiate
them  and  their  policy  positions.  Through  the  mechanisms
outlined above and following elaborate historical processes, they
have come to develop policies and strategies that have a bearing
on the complex course of state formation and change. Whereas
not always linear or univocal, the policies developed by left and
left-leaning executives appear to have strengthened stateness in
the area more than the policies implemented by right and right-
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leaning  governments,  reflecting  the  organizational  and
ideological  ties  linking  governments  and  parties  to  particular
constituencies  and  organized  interest  groups.  From  a
methodological standpoint our claim is that, by underlining the
links between public policies and state capacity and offering an
evaluation  of  executives’ partisanship,  our  investigation  goes
beyond the analysis of formal state institutions and delves into a
deeper  and  richer  political  inquiry,  grounded  on  a  political
economy of  state  capacity that  takes into account  the  role  of
social  groups,  such as urban labor or the middle classes,  and
their interactions, as reflected by the presence and workings of
political parties which these groups represent and act for.
Our  study  adds  to  a  new  line  of  inquiry  relating
democracy, political partisanship and stateness. Although in its
infancy, this path promises to shed some light on this intricate
relationship,  resting  on  the  delicate  balance  of  politics,
economics  and  society:  it  does  so  by  articulating  a  more
complete and credible story about the ways power is shared and
shaped in society and how these interactions affect the forms
and contents of state capacity in contemporary Latin America.
The exploration of these issues represents a propitious avenue of
investigation for the years to come.
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Notes
1. In this article we will use the terms state capacity, state capability and 
stateness as equivalent (Fukuyama, 2005).
2. A fourth more controversial dimension relates to state legitimacy, 
understood as the rightful exercise of power as recognized by voters. 
This component has often been considered instrumental to state 
capacity, rather than one of its essential features (Levi, 2002, p. 40). 
Legitimacy levels, in fact, are sometimes higher in authoritarian 
countries, as China or Azerbaijan, than in democratic ones, as France or
New Zealand (Gilley, 2006, p. 517). Some authors, in addition, find that
legitimacy rights, operationalized as broad approval of a government’s 
rights to oblige people to pay taxes, are not related to political rights 
(Levi & Sacks, 2009, p. 326). We finally excluded legitimacy from our 
operationalization of stateness, since introducing this dimension may 
lead to endogeneity problems when analyzing the democracy-stateness 
nexus.
3. In line with the observations above, special attention is demanded to 
researchers to avoid conflating the ability to administer from the 
services themselves and the policy choice to tax from the ability of the 
state collection apparatus to collect the assessed taxes.
4. We exclude other measures of democracy, for instance the Mainwaring 
and Brinks index (2007), as these authors use critical elements of our 
dependent variable, such as political order, to define the presence and 
strength of democracy in the area, generating endogeneity problems. 
These authors qualify Colombia (1980s to the present) and Peru (1980s 
and early 1990s) as undemocratic, given the government’s and 
paramilitary’s campaigns against guerrillas and drug trafficking carried 
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out during this period (Ibid.: 7). The measure suggested by Huber et al. 
(2012) conversely, is structured around four regimes types 
(Authoritarian Regimes, Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regimes, 
Restricted Democracies and Full Democracies) which drastically 
restrict our analysis to two categories of democracy.
5. Relatively wealthy, enduring and sound democracies exhibit lower 
levels of internal conflict and are associated with lower chances to 
resort to political violence (Collier & Rohner, 2008). Yet, Mansfield 
and Snyder (2005) argue that countries in transition to electoral politics 
are particularly inclined to civil war, revolution, and ethnic and 
sectarian hostility.
6. In  most  Latin  American  countries,  political  parties  tend  to  be  less
established  and  their  ideologies  and  electoral  pledges  less  clearly
articulated than  in  the  industrialized West:  however,  experts  ordered
them  into  the  same  left,  center-left,  center,  center-right,  and  right
political  spectrum,  along  with  an  additional  category  of  personalist
parties (Coppedge 1997; Huber et al. 2006, 949).
7. Scholars  emphasize  the  presence  of  many  “lefts”  in  Latin  America,
differentiating  between  a  programmatic  left  (as  in  Brazil,  Chile,
Uruguay) and a non-programmatic left (as in Argentina and Bolivia),
though they are not always explicit about this (Pribble, 2013; Levitsky
& Roberts 2013; Weyland & Gates, 2011; and Cameron & Hershberg
2010). This taxonomy is important, since it is sensible to assume that
only a programmatic left party would invest in building state capacity.
When parties are not programmatic, electors are not oriented towards
programs in their voting, it is problematic to hold leaders responsible,
and incumbents have no motivation to translate electoral pledges into
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effective policies. Our operationalization (Huber et al., 2012), is largely
in line with this distinction.
8. We  assessed  the  partisan  orientation  of  government  recoding  the
variable in the following way: 0 for left through 8 for right governments
(Huber et al., 2006). This measure has been labeled “Executive Partisan
Balance”.
9. In  Latin  America,  a  14  years  period  corresponds  roughly  to  three
presidential terms (Martinez-Gallardo 2011, p. 13).
10. Duration  refers  to  the  uninterrupted  number  of  years  of  existing
democratic systems, taking 1945 as the first year in our time series.
11. Countries where oil rents are less than 10 per cent of GDP were coded
0; and countries where oil rents are superior to 10 per cent of GDP were
coded 1.
12. For some, ethnic composition does not fuel violence and fragmentation
automatically;  it  does  so,  only  when  trigger  factors,  such  as
unscrupulous  leadership;  opportunistic  neighbors;  and  shattered  or
growing hopes detonate structural contradictions (Gurr, 1994).
13. Namely:  Argentina,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Haiti,  Jamaica  and
Suriname.  The countries  finally  included are:  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
14. As  we  found  some  heteroskedasticity,  we  employed  cluster-robust
standard errors, which yield a consistent VCE estimator (see Arellano,
2003; Stock & Watson, 2008; Wooldridge, 2009).
15. In their classification of political parties in the area, Coppedge (1997)
and  Huber  et  al.  (2012)  distinguish  between  secular  and  Christian
parties.  Point  7  in  Figure  7  corresponds  to  Christian  right-wing
executives.
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16. During  this  period,  tax  collection  grew slightly,  by  about  1  percent
(Gómez & Jiménez, 2012, p. 13).
17. Flores-Macias (2014) claims that security crises in Colombia provided
right parties a unique window of opportunity to strengthen tax capacity,
as illustrated by president Uribe’s adoption, in 2002, of the so-called
“war  tax”,  which  can  be  considered  as  one  of  Colombia’s  most
important policy responses to the FARC challenge.    
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Table. 1 The effect of democracy and partisanship on Stateness in Latin American      
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3
 Coef.  
Robust 
Standard 
Error   Coef.  
Robust 
Standard 
Error   Coef.  
Robust 
Standard 
Error
Stateness difference (t15) 0.214 **** 0.035 0.022 **** 0.003 0.021 **** 0.003
Polity IV -0.074 *** 0.0243 -0.067 *** 0.020
Polity IV*PolityIV   0.012 **** 0.003  0.010 **** 0.002
Executive partisan balance (left- right; seats received)  0.246 ** 0.104  0.151 * 0.083
Executive partisan balance (left- right; seats received * 
Executive partisan balance (left- right; seats received -0.026 ** 0.11 -0.016 * 0.009
Length of Democracy -0.005 0.005  0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.005
Length of Democracy *Length of Democracy -0.000 0.000 -0.000 *** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
Log GDP per capita  0.436 **** 0.102  0.531 **** 0.113  0.495 **** 0.098
Gdp growth (average 5 years)  0.016 *** 0.005  0.022 **** 0.005  0.017 *** 0.005
Oil rents (0=<10%. 1=>10%)  0.007 *** 0.003  0.002 0.003  0.006 *** 0.002
Log gini index  0.217 0.252  0.201 0.261  0.277 0.230
Form of government (0=parliamentary, 1=presidential)  0.252 * 0.146  0.240 * 0.138  0.290 ** 0.146
Log ethnic fractionalization -0.106 0.119 -0.106 0.135 -0.115 0.124
Constant -4.541 **** 1.219 -5.646 **** 1.197 -5.538 **** 1.025
Sigma_u 0.159 0.155 0.182
Sigma_e 0.163 0.167 0.161
Rho 0.486 0.459 0.563
R square 0.667 0.647 0.674
Wald chi (sig.) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Numbers of groups 19 19 19
Numbers of observation 364     364     364    
Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; ****p<0.001. We have applied a random-effects GLS regression.
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Figure 2
Changes in stateness in Chile (1960-2009)
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Figure 3
Changes in stateness in Uruguay (1960-2009)
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Figure 4
Changes in stateness in Paraguay (1960-2009)
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Figure 5
Changes in stateness in Venezuela (1960-2009)
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Abstract: 
In this article, we argue that both democracy and governments’
partisanship have had a bearing on state capacity in Latin America. We
also maintain that state capacity is a condition rooted in history and
society: it can be built or purposefully undermined. In particular, in
Latin America parties of the left have frequently operated to reallocate
social  and  political  clout  in  favor  of  underprivileged  groups:  the
inclusion of the latter in the political process helped states to thwart
pressures  from  dominant  elites  opposing  redistribution  and  tax
increases.  These  mobilized  groups  have  also  pushed  for  universal
public  services,  as  high-quality  education,  health  care  or  public
housing,  which  required  well-functioning  administrations  and  an
adequate  institutional  capacity,  thus  contributing  to  consolidate
stateness in the area.  Whereas previous qualitative studies analyzed
the  mechanisms that  relate  democracy and political  partisanship  to
state capacity, we test this hypothesis quantitatively. To this end, we
estimate the effect over time of democracy, political parties and other
socio-demographic  factors  on  a  composite  measure  of  stateness,
obtaining  supportive  evidence:  in  particular,  we  find  that  higher
democracy levels and left-leaning governments favored the growth of
1
state strength in the area between 1975 and 2009 and discuss these
findings with reference to the political experience of Latin America. 
2
In this article we argue that both democracy and governments’
partisanship  have  a  bearing  on state  capacity  in  Latin  America:  in
particular,  we  find  that  higher  democracy  levels  and  left-leaning
governments favored the growth of state strength in the area between
1975 and 2009. Whereas previous qualitative studies have analyzed
the  mechanisms that  relate  democracy and political  partisanship  to
state  capacity,  we  test  this  hypothesis  quantitatively,  obtaining
supportive evidence. Our work is organized as follows: in the next
section,  we  discuss  the  relevant  literature,  then  define  our  main
dependent, independent and control variables, paying special attention
to the thorny concept of state capacity. Subsequently, we submit our
main hypotheses and summarize the mechanisms at work. Finally, we
estimate the effect over time of democracy, political parties and other
socio-demographic  factors  on  a  composite  measure  of  stateness;
discuss  these  findings  with  reference  to  the  political  experience  of
Latin America; and underline our contribution to the ongoing debate.
Conclusions, as usual, wind up the analysis.
Social science literature has mostly considered democracy and
stateness  as causally  independent  or it  has taken the  latter  to  be  a
precondition  for  the  former  (Wang  &  Xu,  2015).  The  rare  works
analyzing  the  bearing  of  democracy  on  state  capacity  generally
underscore a positive association: the superior political accountability
of democracy lowers corruption and the risk of property expropriation
and  strengthens  bureaucratic  quality  and  the  rule  of  law,  thus
improving overall state capacity (Adserà et al., 2003). As a result of
vigorous political competition, for instance, various non-partisan state
3
organs and policy reforms aimed at increasing government efficiency
were implemented in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia after
their  democratic  transitions (Grzymala-Busse,  2007).  In  Africa,  as
well,  democracy  has  been  empirically  associated  to  several
components  of  state  capacity  as  rule  of  law,  effectiveness,
accountability and control of corruption (Bratton, 2008). In Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines, competitive elections have facilitated
state-building  by  stimulating  the  formation  of  stronger  political
parties; a more vigorous state commitment to voters’ registration; and
the imposition of centralized authority over societal strongmen (Slater,
2008). In short,  the historical influence of parliamentary democracy
has been considered to be an unusually stable predictor of both the
legal  and  fiscal  capacities  of  the  state  (Besley  &  Persson,  2009):
democracy  strengthens  stateness  by  enhancing  government
responsiveness to citizens; by facilitating the diffusion of information
between policy-makers and voters (Bueno de Mesquita  et al., 2015);
and by increasing political contestation (Wang & Xu, 2015).
The influence of democracy, however, is still controversial as
strong developmental states have existed under authoritarian regimes
in Asia (for instance in Taiwan and South Korea).  In  addition,  the
assertion  that  democracy  strengthens  the  consolidation  of  state
institutions must confront the sensible objection that democracy can
subsist  only  after  a  minimally  functional  state  is  already  in  place
(Carbone & Memoli, 2015). Thus, analyzing African regimes in the
early 1990s, Bates (2008) claims that electoral competition and state
failure go together since, during democratic openings, incumbents are
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less secure about their  tenure and rewards from predation multiply,
encouraging  domestic  conflicts  and  state  collapse.  In  new
democracies, in addition, objectionable politicians might emerge who
view the new democratic politics as a "one-time opportunity to get
rich" (Svolik, 2012). Others, finally, point at a non-linear relationship:
Charrón  and  Lapuente  (2010)  claim  that  deprived  countries  enjoy
higher  ‘administrative  capacity’  under  despotic  rule,  while  richer
countries perform better under democracy. Bäck and Hadenius (2008)
similarly  contend  that  the  association  between  level  of
democratization and ’administrative capacity’ is negative at low levels
of  democratization,  but  positive  at  higher  levels.  Administrative
capacity declines initially as the political system opens and a plurality
of social  and political  actors undermine authoritarian controls from
above: however,  as mature and more stabilized democratic regimes
develop, bottom-up mechanisms of policy control emerge that help
attain the highest levels of administrative capacity.
In Latin America, democracy has not been typically studied as
a determinant of state capacity, but rather as one of its outcomes: thus,
poor democratic conditions are often explained as a consequence of
local  states weakness.  Accordingly,  among the key determinants of
state capacity scholars mention particular historical heritages; features
such  as  the  amount  of  trust  in  public  and  private  institutions;
economic and social inequalities; and globalization (Centeno, 2009).
Cárdenas,  however,  singles  out  political  inequality  as  one  of  the
factors that possibly account for the extraordinarily low state capacity
in  the  region,  in  conjunction  with  economic  inequality,  regional
5
struggles, and civil war (2010). Others maintain that democratic rule
strengthens  the  capacity  of  the  state  to  provide  citizens  with
fundamental social services, by encouraging politicians to reach the
poor  and  those  more  exposed  to  risk,  and these  latter  to  organize
(Haggard & Kaufmann, 2008). 
Whether  and how in  Latin  America  state  capacity  has  been
shaped  by  democratic  rule, however,  remains  an  open  question.
Acemoglu  and Robinson (2008),  for instance,  notice that  the  trend
toward greater democracy in the area has not been accompanied by a
similar change in state capacity, which has remained especially low.
They argue  that,  even if  de jure democratic  institutions have  been
established (political rights, voting and checks on the executive), the
political balance has not changed for the presence of crucial  de facto
powers,  as  dominant  social  groups.  Likewise,  Cheibub  (1998)
underlines that, from 1970 to 1990, governments’ extractive capacity
has  not  been  much  stronger  in  democracies  than  in  authoritarian
regimes. Grassi and Memoli (forthcoming), finally, find that between
1995  and  2009  democracy  has  weakened  the  negative  effects  of
autocracy on state capacity, but it has been insufficient, by itself, to
promote its strengthening. There are, in short, several objections to the
view that democracy always advances stateness: antagonistic electoral
competition  can  undermine  a  state  and  democratic  petitions  may
overburden  and  deteriorate  political  institutions  (Hagopian  &
Mainwaring,  2005).  Rather  than  contributing  to  reinforce  state
institutions and increase their effectiveness, therefore, the acceptance
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of  formally  democratic  institutions  may  actually  corrode  or
disintegrate state authority and public services.
State  capacity,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  condition  rooted  in
history and society: it can be built or purposefully undermined (Grassi
&  Memoli,  forthcoming).  In  most  instances,  states  that  achieved
vigorous stateness in time did not have the necessary ability nor the
right  bureaucracies  to  do  so  in  the  beginning:  where  a  political
leadership committed to growth and equality had reached a settlement
with  domestic  actors  to  define  a  common  policy  framework,  a
developmental  and  welfare-  improving  bureaucracy  was  typically
created to support it (Haggard & Kaufmann 2008). In other cases, a
weaker state capacity (the limited power to levy taxes, for instance)
was the result of the veto power exercised by powerful social groups
that successfully resisted increases in the tax load (Huber & Stephens
2012, 41). Parties of the left generally operate to reallocate social and
political clout in favor of underprivileged groups: the inclusion of the
latter  in  the  political  process  helps  states  to  thwart  pressures  from
dominant  elites  opposing  redistribution  and  tax  increases.  These
mobilized  groups  push  for  administratively  challenging  universal
public  services,  as  high-quality  education,  health  care  or  public
housing, and the institutional capacity necessary to provide them, thus
contributing to consolidate stateness. Parties of the right, in turn, often
advocate  order  and  legality,  since  crime  and  violence  jeopardize
business  investments and growth and are  usually  aimed at  affluent
individuals.  A stronger  state,  in  addition,  allows  for  an  effective
enforcement  of  property  rights,  duly  supported  by  smoothly
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functioning legal institutions, and contributes to restrain widespread
corruption.  Where  established  safeguards  of  this  kind  are  absent,
insecurity  and  unpredictability  arise,  which  endanger  new
investments,  the  creation  of  jobs  and the  development  of  business
(Fukuyama, 2007). 
Finally,  electoral  competition  crucially  interacts  with
ideological preference. When election results are uncertain, regardless
of ideological orientation, parties may be driven to embark on policies
that they might otherwise ignore, for the sole purpose of gaining or
retaining power (Haggard & Kaufman 2008, 360).  Policies may be
endorsed to capture the independent voter at the center and will be
more  moderate,  or  reformist,  than  the  ideological  position  of  each
party implies. Consequently, left-wing and right-wing executives may
become more similar: the former cannot support their favorite policy
of  welfare  state  extension  because  of  budget  limitations;  the  latter
cannot  adopt  their  favorite  policy  of  cutbacks  because  their
constituencies  have  become  attached  to  welfare  state  programs
(Schumacher & Vis 2009).  To sum up, the contribution of political
partisanship to the construction of state capacity in Latin America is a
question that demands an empirical answer.
State Capacity
State  capacity  is  a  thorny  concept,  arduous  to  define  and
operationalize:  in  fact,  there  is  greater  scholarly  agreement  on key
features of the state than on how to operationalize such features or the
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concept of the state itself  (Carbone, 2013, 6). In the last few years,
however,  political  scientists  and  sociologists  have  engaged  in  an
extensive  and  critical  debate:  while  failing  to  yield  a  common
position, the ongoing discussion suggests points of convergence (see
the  special  issues  of  Studies  in  Comparative  International
Development,  2008;  and  Revista  de  Ciencia  Política,  2012).1
Definitions  of  state  capacity  often  rest  on  the  ability  of  state
institutions  to  effectively  implement  official  goals  (Sikkink,  1991).
This approach solves a first significant problem, namely the normative
definition of what the state ought to do or how it ought to do it, and
underlines the fact that capable states may organize the economy and
society  in  different  ways.  Thus,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  neoliberal
cutbacks in state intervention and bureaucracy in Latin America, one
should be able to avoid confounding minimal but capable states as
Chile with essentially weaker states. A second recurring theme has to
do  with  Mann’s  “infrastructural  power”  concept,  that  is  “the
institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its
territories  and  logistically  implement  decisions”  (2008).  Mann’s
contribution  underlines  “the  question  of  the  state’s  authority  over
territory”  and  “whether  governments  can  implement  policies,
including the provision of public goods” (Fortin, 2010, 656). In short,
the infrastructural power of the state  may be read as the ability to
translate policy choices into outcomes. In addition, many authors also
typically  indicate  state  capacity  through  at  least  one  of  three
constituent  elements:  the  ability  of  a  state  to  impose  a  degree  of
internal political order, by way of an exclusive control over the means
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of coercion; the proper workings of a basic administrative apparatus;
and the capacity to extract revenue from its citizens.2 
Weber  famously  defined  the  state  in  terms  of  its  coercive
capacity,  based on the  monopoly  of  the  legitimate  use  of  physical
force  within  its  territory  (Weber,  1978).  Imposing  political  order
requires a state to secure its frontiers, defend domestic order and apply
laws and policies by restraining violence, i.e. to control the territory
by both suppressing and preventing internal conflict and defending the
borders from external  invasion.  A basic  administrative  apparatus is
working properly when a professional and insulated bureaucracy is
able  to  plan  and  develop  policies  and  deliver  public  goods  and
services,  which  implies  technical  skills,  competent  civil  servants,
limited  public  corruption,  and  an  effective  influence  across  state
territory. Extractive capacity, finally, indicates the ability of the state
to  extract  resources  from  society,  mainly  in  the  form  of  tax  and
implies  a  series  of  critical  competences  and  skills:  instruments  to
access  population;  means  to  assemble  and  organize  complex
information; the possibility to count on law-abiding civil servants; and
ways of assuring popular compliance with tax policies (Hanson and
Sigman, 2013, 4).3
The  operationalization  of  state  capacity  has  also  been
controversial,  but  some points  of  convergence  are  also  discernible.
Most agree that any single variable is unlikely to adequately capture
its multidimensional nature (Hendrix, 2010, 283). Composite indexes
of  the  concept  should also  avoid incorporating potential  causes,  as
lack  of  democracy,  or  expected  consequences,  as  humanitarian
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disasters (Gutiérrez, 2011; Mata & Ziaja, 2009; Soifer, 2012). Finally,
the  ideal  data  should  be  based  on  time-series  cross-national
measurements of stateness that ensure wide-ranging geographic and
temporal  coverage,  enabling  researchers  to  take  advantage  of
variations  across  space  and  time.  Based  on  these  reflections,  we
decided to use the State Capacity Dataset (1960-2010) elaborated by
Jonathan Hanson and Rachel Sigman (2013), which covers up to 174
countries for the period 1960-2010. The dataset rests on the three main
components examined above: coercive, administrative and extractive
capacities, which are measured in turn by 24 main indicators. By way
of  latent  variable  analysis,  finally,  the  authors  identify  a  series  of
underlying factors that signify overall state capacity. 
More precisely, coercive capacity is indicated by four sets of
data,  beginning  with  military  personnel  and  expenditures.  Yet,  a
sizeable military force may signify war or domestic insecurity, both of
which  lessen  state  capacity.  Consequently  additional  data  has  been
added, as the extent to which the state has a monopoly on the use of
force; is directly involved in committing violence; or is present in the
territory,  by  looking  for  instance  at  the  extent  to  which  land  is
mountainous and therefore arduous to reach. Administrative capacity
is  evaluated  also  based  on  four  groups  of  data:  the  ICRG
(International  Country  Risk  Guide)  Bureaucratic  Quality  Index;  an
assessment of census frequency, which denotes both the capacity to
gather data and effective territorial control; measurements of contract
intensive money, which stand for the state capacity to police economic
exchange; and an additional series of indexes related to administrative
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capacity  and  civil  service  value,  such  as  the  Weberianness  Index
elaborated by Rauch and Evans (2000). Extractive capacity, finally, is
initially measured by tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. In order to
distinguish between policy choices and extractive capacity, however,
additional  measures  were  added,  as  the  ratio  of  tax  revenues
originating from income,  domestic  consumption  and property taxes
relative to revenue coming from international trade, as custom duties.
The  higher  the  proportion  of  the  former,  which  require  a  more
structured bureaucratic apparatus, the greater is the expected level of
extractive (and administrative) capacity of the state. Other indicators,
finally,  show  the  link  between  actual  revenue  collection  and  the
expected tax yield, given GDP per capita, mineral production, exports
and additional relevant factors.
Independent and control variables 
We decided to use a minimalist notion of democracy to avoid
merging  attributes  of  political  authority  and  state  qualities  (as
capacity), since our objective is to disentangle this relationship. Our
procedural definition is based on universal suffrage; free, transparent
and competitive elections; and the defense of crucial civil and political
rights (along with the presence of alternative sources of information).
Formal democratic institutions must also be sovereign (Dahl, 1989).
Consequently,  democracies  do  not  comprise  hybrid  or  ‘electoral
authoritarian’  regimes,  since  these  do  not  convene  free  and  fair
elections,  an  essential  requirement  of  this  type  of  government
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(Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Democracies, finally, may
also  be  imperfect  and  incomplete:  ‘defective’  democracies  only
partially  safeguard  political  rights  (Merkel  2001);  ‘illiberal’
democracies  inadequately  protect  civil  rights  and  the  rule  of  law
(Zakaria,  1997);  and  ‘delegative’  democracies   are  insufficiently
responsive  to  citizen  choices,  poorly  constrained  by  government
agencies and not respectful of the rule of law (O'Donnell, 1994). To
measure democracy, we resorted to the Polity IV data, on a scale that
runs from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy): the curators of
the  Polity  IV  dataset  distinguish  among  ‘autocratic  regimes’;
‘anocracies’; and ‘democracies’. ‘Anocracy’ is a term used to describe
a regime type that is characterized by inherent qualities of political
instability  and  ineffectiveness,  as  well  as  an  "incoherent  mix  of
democratic  and  autocratic  traits  and  practices."  (Marshall  &  Cole,
2014).  These  regimes are  further  differentiated among ‘closed’ and
‘open’ varieties:  the  former  are  characterized  by  Polity  IV  values
comprised between -5 and 0; the latter by values ranging from 1 to 5.
Values  of  6,  or  larger,  denote  democratic  regimes,  while  values
included between -10 and -6 identify autocratic regimes.4
Democracy  impacts  stateness  by  reducing  violence  and
corruption  and  increasing  administrative  efficacy.  It  lowers  violent
conflict  by  offering  institutionalized  communication  channels  with
political  adversaries,  by incorporating them into  the  debate  and by
yielding  to  some  of  their  petitions.5 By  making  the  government
accountable, citizens are more likely to identify with democracy and
the state and have fewer reasons for violent opposition. Independent
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civil  society  groups  monitor  and  assess  state  functioning  and
cooperate with the state to recommend new policy ideas. Finally, by
making elected  officials  and administrators  responsible,  democratic
processes and sanctions restrain incompetence,  arbitrariness and the
diffusion of bribery (Carbone, 2013). We do not rule out, however,
that the relationship between democracy and stateness may assume a
non-linear form: as recalled above (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008), different
political regimes may have a diverse impact on stateness.
We classified Latin American parties based on a left/center-left
versus  right/center-right  dichotomy,  as  in  the  more  industrialized
countries, following the categorization suggested by Coppedge (1997;
Huber et al., 2012 for an update).6 Coppedge made use of experts who
classified parties, along this dimension, into left; center-left; center;
center-right;  right;  and personalist.  Accordingly,  parties of the right
(for instance, Brazilian ARENA) attracted the successors of nineteenth
century  traditional  elites;  fascists  and  neo-fascists;  and  the
conservative  military  (Coppedge,  1997,  8).  Center-right  parties
(Argentine UCD) “targeted middle- or lower-class voters in addition
to elite voters, by stressing cooperation with the private sector, public
order,  clean  government,  morality,  or  the  priority  of  growth  over
distribution” (Ibid.). Coppedge classified as centrist (Argentine UCR)
parties  that  “stressed  classic  political  liberalism,  the  rule  of  law,
human  rights,  or  democracy,  without  a  salient  social  or  economic
agenda”. Among them are “governing parties whose policies are so
divided between positions both to the left and to the right of center
that  no  orientation  that  is  mostly  consistent  between  elections  is
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discernible” (Ibid.). Changing partisan orientation, center-left parties
(Venezuelan  Acción  Democrática)  “stress  justice,  equality,  social
mobility, or the complementarity of distribution and accumulation in a
way intended not to alienate middle or upper-class voters” (Coppedge,
1997, 9). Left parties (Partido Socialista de Chile; Communist parties)
“employ  Marxist  ideology  or  rhetoric  and  stress  the  priority  of
distribution over accumulation and/or the exploitation of the working
class by capitalists and imperialists and advocate a strong role for the
state to correct social and economic injustices”. (Ibid.: 10).7 Finally,
parties are catalogued as personalist (Peruvian Cambio 90 or Bolivian
Movimiento al Socialismo) if they “base their primary appeal on the
charisma,  authority,  or  efficacy  of  their  leader  rather  than  on  any
principles or platforms, which are too vague or inconsistent to permit
a plausible classification of the party in any other way" (Ibid.). We use
a  continuous  variable  to  measure  the  partisan  orientation  of
governments  (Executive  Partisan  Balance,  EPB)  during  democratic
periods.8  When the values of EPB increase, the ideological leaning of
the Executive moves right (Huber et al. 2012). We also account for the
fact that state capacity needs time in order to change. 
Scholars’ opinions (and the available evidence) on the role of
partisanship in shaping state capacity are mixed. Incumbency of left
parties  is  central  for  welfare  state  development  according  to
comparative  historical  evidence  (Huber  &  Stephens  2012).  More
recently, in line with their major political objectives, Left governments
have made efforts towards extending democracy and citizens’ rights,
restoring state capacity, freeing while regulating markets, and building
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a  satisfactory  technical  and  political  environment  for  skilled
policymaking  (Bresser-Pereira,  2001).  Other  investigations  link
vigorous  mass  mobilization  and  left-party  rule  to  the  progress  of
infrastructurally  accomplished  welfare  states.  However,  alternative
studies point at the consolidation of state capacity under right-leaning
executives (Fukuyama & Colby, 2011; Rangel, 2005) or to a process
of ideological convergence by major political parties and governments
that  blurs  partisan  and  policy  differences  (Haggard  &  Kaufmann,
2008).  As  a  result,  we leave  an  initial  answer  to  this  issue  to  our
empirical analysis.
Our model is completed by a number of control variables. To
start with, we suggest that past levels of state capacity have a bearing
on  current  stateness  levels.  It  has  been  argued  (and  extensively
recognized) that state capacity is path dependent and varies slowly:
critical junctures in the past place institutional arrangements on paths
or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter (Centeno, 2009;
Soifer, 2012). Actual degrees of state strength are therefore strongly
affected  by  previous  ones:  consequently,  we  added  a  stateness
difference variable calculated on stateness values prevailing 15 years
earlier.9 We  also  added  political  controls:  democratic  duration  and
presidentialism.  We  believe  that  democratic  duration  is  associated
with stateness, since time allows democratic institutions and practices
to get established and to take root; is necessary for democratic norms
to develop and have an impact; and may encourage more participation
and influence for deprived groups not only through parties, but also
through  the  development  of  civil  society  and  nongovernmental
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organisations (Nelson, 2007, 89), all of which  aid the completion of
state  consolidation.10 Presidentialism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  usually
thought of as a direct and effective way to govern and a weaker form
of veto power in the political process, compared to parliamentarism
(Huber  &  Stephens,  2001,  55).  Since  we  expect  political  systems
characterized by stronger veto points in the policy process to slow
down the expansion of stateness during the period of observation, we
believe that presidentalism should have the opposite effect. 
In order to test a possible spurious relationship between our
main variables we also  incorporate  levels  and growth of  economic
development: in fact, both state capacity and democratic governments
might be the upshot of economic development over time. A host of
authors  argue  in  favor  of  an  independent  effect  of  economic
development on state capacity. Pellegrini and Gerlagh vindicate that
wealth fosters state capacity, since richer countries may afford better
institutions and administrative structures and many factors associated
with affluence, as levels of urbanization or schooling, lessen the social
acceptance of corruption (2008, 250). Saylor contends that the quest
for private profit is a potent state building cause: when pursuing profit
during booms, export-oriented actors repeatedly strive for new state-
supplied public goods,  whose delivery encourages the expansion of
state capacity (2012). Inequality is one of the major problems faced by
the Latin American subcontinent: while poverty has been alleviated in
recent years, inequality has proven more difficult to overcome. Higher
inequality  has  been  associated  with  lower  stateness:  historians
Engerman and Sokoloff contend that inequality has been detrimental
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to the emergence of legal and fiscal capacity in Latin America (2002).
Cárdenas  and  Tuzemen  also  find  that  higher  levels  of  income
inequality lead to lower investments in state capacity (2010, 1-45). 
Large oil rents (whenever both the state and democracy are not
yet solid) deteriorate state capacity because they exempt the state from
establishing  an  efficient  tax  collection  system.  Thus,  in  these
countries,  governments  tend  to  be  unaccountable  to  the  general
population  and  people,  in  turn,  are  less  likely  to  demand
accountability  and  political  representation.  Oil  wealth,  in  addition,
fuels  patronage,  which  dilute  demands  for  representation  and
accountability (Karl,  2004).11 Where ethnic fractionalization is high,
elected  governments  must  strike  a  balance  between  insertion  of
minority groups and protection of governing effectiveness (Ben-Meir,
2006); citizens have usually lower confidence in political institutions;
and  democracy  is  less  likely  to  become  established  (Sojo,  2011).
Accordingly,  it  is reasonable to link high fractionalization to  lower
stateness.12 Larger territories, finally,  may also prove challenging to
govern,  since  (ceteris  paribus)  vertical  integration  and  horizontal
coordination become more demanding (Herbst & Mills, 2006).
Data, methods, findings’ illustration and discussion
We chose Latin America to ensure comparability within a most
similar research design:  the subcontinent,  in  addition,  represents an
ideal testing ground for our main hypotheses, the bearing of political
dimensions on state strength. In this area, democracies are plentiful
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and differ in quality (unlike, for instance, the Middle East), while local
parties’ ideologies  may  be  sorted  along  a  right-to-left  continuum
which  meaningfully  structures  politics  and  political  struggle  (as
opposed,  for  instance,  to  the  political  beliefs  of  most  African  and
Asian parties). Political views that cause stable and intelligible policy
choices, in fact, even if less easily discernible than in the developed
West, are crucial for an enquiry on the potential connections between
political parties acting in a democracy, partisanship and state capacity,
and  justifies  the  choice  of  the  subcontinent  to  assess  our  research
questions. 
Our analysis embraces all Latin American countries, observed
between  1960  and  2009:  we  originally  considered  26  countries  in
total,  14  belonging  to  Central  America  and  12  to  South  America.
Missing data problems forced us to exclude seven of them from our
final report.13  Our analysis is based on a pooled cross-sectional time-
series. The advantage of longitudinal panel information, compared to
cross sectional information, consists in its potential for an analysis of
social,  political  and  economic  dynamics  at  different  levels.  We
employed different random effects longitudinal regression models on a
long unbalanced panel dataset, using the software STATA.14 
We begin with a descriptive analysis of the trend of stateness
(Fig. 1). During the period of observation (1960-2009), our measure
of  state  capacity  has  increased  everywhere,  especially  in  countries
where the quality of democratic governments has been intermediate to
strong and the left has exercised power for significant periods of time,
as in  Chile,  Trinidad and Tobago,  Uruguay,  Brazil  and Costa  Rica.
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However, equal or slightly less prominent increases in state strength
have also occurred where governments were controlled equally by left
and right parties, as in Panama, or mostly by parties of the right, as in
Colombia and Guatemala. In addition, left executives have played a
role  where  state  capacity  has  increased  the  least,  as  in  Guyana,
Jamaica  or  Venezuela,  countries  characterized  by  diverse  levels  of
democratic quality. In short, no clear indication on the possible links
between stateness, democracy and political partisanship comes from a
reading of these data alone. 
This impression is strengthened by a graphic assessment of the
way stateness has changed over time in specific countries: in Chile the
authoritarian Pinochet era (1973-1990) is associated with an increase
in  stateness,  especially  until  1981  (Fig.  2).  Democracy  further
intensifies state capacity,  but the more prominent rise  occurs under
moderate  Christian  democratic  presidents  (1990-2000)  rather  than
under their  progressive colleagues within the  Concertación alliance
(2000-2010).  In  Uruguay  the  military  period  (1973-1985)  also
corresponds  to  an  increase  in  stateness,  which  is  maintained  and
enhanced by the following democratic governments,  led by centrist
and conservative Colorado and Blanco presidents (1985-2005): their
contribution to state capacity is difficult to distinguish from that of the
Frente Amplio (Fig. 3). In other cases, as in Paraguay, the growth of
state  capacity  coincides  with  the  authoritarian  rule  of  General
Stroessner,  especially  between  1960  and  1981,  while  democratic
governments (under the guide of the conservative  Colorados)  were
not able, at least until 2009, to improve the stateness scores reached in
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1981  by  the  tyrant  (Fig.  4).  In  the  case  of  Venezuela,  finally,
improvements  of  state  capacity  were  experience  both  under
conservative and progressive democratic governments, as with Copei
(Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente) president
Caldera between 1969 and 1974 and MVR (Movimiento V [Quinta]
República) president Chàvez between 2002 and 2009 (Fig. 5). Again,
it is hard to discern a clear-cut pattern emerging from this information.
A more refined investigation is in order. In Tab. 1 we analyze 3
models: in the first two, we focus separately on levels of democracy
and the impact of executives’ ideological leanings, along with control
variables.  Subsequently,  we estimate the aggregate bearing of these
variables on the dependent variable. Specifically, in the first model we
regress the indicator of state capacity against levels of democracy (in
linear and quadratic forms) controlling for context variables: a lagged
(fifteen years) stateness variable;  a measure of democratic duration
(again in linear and quadratic forms); level of economic development;
economic growth over the previous 5 years;  oil  rents;  Gini  values;
form of  government and ethnic fractionalization.  Results  show that
democratic quality  (but not democratic duration) has contributed to
strengthen stateness in the area between 1975 and 2009 (Rsq=0.667).
In the second model, we insert executive partisanship which shows a
curvilinear  association  with  stateness:  moving  from  left  to  right
governments, stateness increases first and then declines, as expected
(Rsq=0.647). In model 3, finally, we incorporate levels of democracy
and  executive  partisanship  along  with  our  control  variables  and
observe  that  our  main  results  are  confirmed  (Rsq=0.674). More
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precisely,  authoritarian  governments  and  both  closed  and  open
anocracies are associated with negative stateness: however, as political
regimes get  freer  and more  effective,  approaching the  threshold of
democracy in the Polity IV scale (value 16 in Fig. 6), the impact on
stateness becomes positive.
Our main findings suggest that democratizing always benefits
stateness: however, the impact of regimes becomes positive only when
a significant level of political opening is reached. Democracy fosters
an efficient state through a series of mechanisms that reduce violent
conflict and establish forms of steering and control from below, as a
free press and an independent civil society;  by way of instruments of
policy  control  that  promote  administrative  capacity;  and  by
institutionalized  procedures  and  incentives  that  reinforce  the
accountability  structure.  Yet,  democratic  institutions must  be put in
place  and  be  effective.  Empirical  results  fit  our  predictions  on
executive partisanship as well (Fig. 7). Moving from left executives
(points 0 and 1) to executives of the center-left (points 2 and 3) the
impact of partisanship proves positive but decreasing.  Under center
right and right executives (points from 4 to 7) the impact becomes
negative, but the relationship is statistically significant only for right-
wing executives.15 In short, not only we confirmed the expected causal
direction,  but  also  determined  that  the  effects  of  our  independent
variables  developed  at  values  identifying  relevant  qualitative
conditions: democratic governments in the Polity IV scale and left and
left-leaning governments in Coppedge’s taxonomy (Figures 6 and 7).
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In addition,  state  capacity at  15 years shows significant and
positive,  meaning  that  earlier  stateness  levels  have  a  bearing  on
current  levels.  Both  economic  development  and  economic  growth
have a positive sway on stateness, as expected, while oil rents display
a  positive  sign,  against  predictions:  instead  of  smothering  political
representation and weakening tax collection as the prevailing theories
anticipate, oil proceeds appear to have stimulated stateness in the area
(especially  in  Brazil,  Mexico,  Venezuela,  and  Colombia)  possibly
through public investments, expenditures and the overall contribution
to economic wealth, or else these positive effects have been stronger
than  those  classically  underlined  by  the  literature.  Presidential
regimes,  finally,  look  more  favorable  to  state  capacity  that
parliamentary  ones,  as  foreseen,  while  democratic  duration,  ethnic
fractionalization and Gini values fail to reach statistical significance. 
In short,  the argument presented here is that democracy and
left  governments  promote  the  limitation  of  social  and  economic
prerogatives,  thus  contributing  to  a  strengthening of  state  capacity.
The  adoption  and  implementation  of  governments’  policies  face
constraints, including policy capture by powerful social factions and
opposition  by  organized  interest  groups.  Democratic  regimes  with
good development outcomes attempt to surmount such limitations by
engaging  citizens  more  actively  with  the  purpose  of  building  the
needed consensus for state policies: such participation improves the
capacity  to  allocate  resources  more  equally  and  effectively  and
reduces  the  costs  involved  in  policy  enforcement.  Thus,  the
recognition of the right to question policies and make petitions has
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been  crucial  to  the  strategies  of  state  capacity  building  in  Latin
American democratic regimes. Whereas democracies offer chances for
participation  and  contestation  in  the  policy  process,  however,
redistributive  results  cannot  be  taken for  granted:  it  is  through the
decisive involvement of left governments that the mismatch between
political  and  social  powers  has  been  drastically  reduced  and  state
strength  has  increased  in  the  area.  This  argument  emphasizes  the
importance  of  reallocating  social  and  political  power  in  favor  of
subordinate  groups  so  as  to  construct  bureaucratic  capacities  that
reinforce  both  growth and redistribution  and defeat  pressures  from
privileged strata, which repeatedly defy redistributive policies. Social
transfers are a vital component of such agreements. 
Accordingly,  the states usually classified by the literature as
the most capable in the region have tended to coincide with the most
vigorous democracies, as Costa Rica and Uruguay, along with Chile
and Argentina  (Cárdenas,  2010;  Centeno,  2009).  In  the  first  three,
progressive parties intent on redistribution were crucial in the process
of welfare state building (Grassi, 2014). More generally, redistributive
politics  have  been  more  inclusive  when  rural-urban  alliances that
included a large part of the working poor have been struck, permitting
to  expand  welfare  rights  to  most  citizens.  In  these  countries,
progressive  political  parties  have  promoted  the  adoption  of  social
rights,  and  groups  have  connected  with  the  state  as  rights-bearing
citizens rather than clients. Disputed elections, sometimes leading to
alternation in power, encouraged these parties to maintain their social
movement  features,  which  in  turn  showed  crucial  for  upholding
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sympathetic links with the poor. In addition, at the end of the 1990s, a
‘new  left’  has  appeared  in  the  subcontinent,  which  assumed  the
essential tenets of market economics, while approving reforms such as
the enactment of welfare plans for the underprivileged; a new concern
for public safety; a more dynamic role for the state as overseer and
arbitrator between capital and labor; the expansion and improvement
of  public  services;  and the  introduction  of  a  more  progressive  tax
system (Barrett et al., 2008, 22). 
Our conclusions are partly in line with, and partly supplement,
the scant literature on these issues. We developed the only previous
analysis  on  this  topic  in  Latin  America  (Grassi  and  Memoli,
forthcoming)  suggesting  that,  over  extended  periods  of  time,
democracy has played a greater role than previously acknowledged:
from 1975 to 2009 democratic governments, compared to autocracies
and anocracies, did contribute to make stateness more robust. We also
confirmed the impact of executives’ partisanship, showing in greater
detail  the  bearing  of  different  political  leanings  on  state  capacity.
Previous authors had argued that the weakness of the state in Latin
America  depended  on  pervasive  economic  inequality:  economic
inequality, however, is also a reflection of left parties’ weakness, and
we illustrated the mechanisms relating these parties to state capacity
(Cárdenas,  2010).  For  Haggard  and  Kaufmann  (2008),  democracy
may fortify  the  state  by endorsing more  progressive  social  welfare
schemes.  In  the  region,  in  turn,  more  progressive  social  welfare
systems  have  been  linked  to  the  existence  of  a  stronger  left:  left
governments  have  more  forcefully  sponsored  redistributive  welfare
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and checked the intentional boycotting of critical state powers, such as
tax  extraction,  which  infringed  upon  the  privileges  of  local  elites
(Grassi, 2014). 
Tab. 1 Here
The case of Chile may help illustrate the argument. The left-
leaning  governments  led  by  presidents  Lagos  (2000-2006)  and
Bachelet  (2006-2010)  deeply  reformed  education,  public  health,
social security and pensions,  greatly enhancing social assistance for
Chile’s poorest citizens; approved a series of laws on integrity (2003)
and transparency (2009) in the Public Administration; diminished the
number  of  civil  servants  directly  chosen  by  the  Executive;  and
inaugurated a Senior Management Service System, whose access was
regulated by competitive public exams, making civil service careers
more professional. In 2005, a reform also enhanced the Constitutional
Tribunal’s autonomy and jurisdiction regarding the constitutionality of
laws  and  administrative  acts,  making  it  one  of  the  most  powerful
tribunal in the world, able to stop governments’ decrees and protect
citizens’ rights  against  powerful  private  groups.  The  armed forces’
special privileges over elected politicians, in addition, were drastically
cut (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010).16 
One of  the  most  important  social  reforms promoted by left
governments in Chile was president Lagos’ Plan de Acceso Universal
con  Garantías  Explícitas (Regime  of  Explicit  Health  Guarantees
Plan),  also  labelled  ‘Plano  AUGE’  from  its  acronym.  The  plan
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intended to further the quality and accessibility of public sector health
services, especially for the least advantaged, by supplying universal
medical  assistance  to  people  meeting certain  age  requirements  and
suffering from one of a set of itemized diseases (initially 25, currently
80). In addition it established new standards for both the quality and
quantity of the services provided: these constituted a specific social
right to which all citizens were entitled and that the state guaranteed
both legally and financially. The law also set maximum waiting times
for the delivery of medical treatment and ensured that the required
procedures  and  technologies  were  offered  by  qualified  health
professionals (Missoni & Solimano, 2010). This reform, finally, was
supplemented by an information system and by specific analyses to
evaluate compliance monitoring and impact assessment. To sum up, a
series  of  institutions  and  practices  were  organized  and  reinforced,
which have been customarily related to capable states.
Our claim does not imply that right governments are unable to
strengthen  state  capacity.  In  the  last  decades,  state  capacity  has
increased under right governments in Colombia (see Fig. 1). While the
extent of their achievements remains unclear (Feldmann, 2012), right
executives helped to rebuild domestic order by curbing both political
and common violence. Following Uribe’s peace talks with the AUC,
quite a few paramilitary leaders have been imprisoned and a dozen
major  commanders  have  been  extradited  to  the  United  States:
authorities  initiated  a  demilitarization  process  that  turned  into  the
dissolution  of  an  intimidating  armed  force.  In  addition,  homicides
have dropped from about 28,000 in 2002 to 15,000 in 2010, while tax
27
extraction capacity has increased from 10.9 per cent of GDP in 1990
to 17.8 per cent of GDP in 2009, reaching a top of 18.2 per cent in
2006 (Gómez Sabaini and Jiménez 2012, 13).17 In 2004, lastly, a civil
service law ended five years of legal uncertainty, in which provisional
selections  affected  38  percent  of  personnel,  introducing  new merit
based  criteria  for  admission  (Grindle,  2010,  22).  In  short,  right
governments were able to expand overall state capacity by fortifying
domestic order and developing other key stateness dimensions.
  
   
Conclusions
Our investigation set up to determine the impact of democracy
and political partisanship on stateness in Latin America between 1975
and 2009. We found that democracy does propel state capacity: while
the progressive opening of political regimes contributed to lessen the
negative  impact  of  autocracies  and  anocracies,  only  democratic
regimes exercised a positive bearing on stateness. In a similar manner,
our  hypothesis  on  the  effects  of  the  partisan  composition  of
government  was  proven  correct:  only  left  and  left  leaning
governments were found to have  a  positive  and significant impact,
while other executives did not show a discernible trend, except for  the
most conservative governments which did play a negative role. The
almost  perfect  fit  between our  empirical  findings  and the  expected
outcomes  greatly  strengthens  these  conclusions,  which  can  be
enunciated  not  only  in  quantitative  and  relative  terms,  but  also
28
qualitatively with reference to the concepts of democratic regimes, on
the one hand, and left and left-leaning executives on the other.
Although  operating  at  times  as  self-interested  actors,  Latin
American parties and governments pursue objectives which are valued
by their electoral bases and that differentiate them and their  policy
positions.  Through  the  mechanisms  outlined  above  and  following
elaborate historical processes, they have come to develop policies and
strategies that have a bearing on the complex course of state formation
and  change.  Whereas  not  always  linear  or  univocal,  the  policies
developed  by  left  and  left-leaning  executives  appear  to  have
strengthened stateness in the area more than the policies implemented
by right and right-leaning governments, reflecting the organizational
and  ideological  ties  linking  governments  and  parties  to  particular
constituencies and organized interest groups. From a methodological
standpoint our claim is that, by underlining the links between public
policies and state capacity and offering an evaluation of executives’
partisanship,  our  investigation  goes  beyond  the  analysis  of  formal
state institutions and delves into a deeper and richer political inquiry,
grounded  on  a  political  economy  of  state  capacity  that  takes  into
account the role of social groups, such as urban labor or the middle
classes,  and  their  interactions,  as  reflected  by  the  presence  and
workings of political parties which these groups represent and act for.
Our study adds to a new line of inquiry relating democracy,
political partisanship and stateness. Although in its infancy, this path
promises to shed some light on this intricate relationship, resting on
the delicate balance of politics, economics and society: it does so by
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articulating a more complete and credible story about the ways power
is shared and shaped in society and how these interactions affect the
forms and contents of state capacity in contemporary Latin America.
The  exploration  of  these  issues  represents  a  propitious  avenue  of
investigation for the years to come.
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NOTE
 In this article we will use the terms state capacity, state capability and
stateness as equivalent (Fukuyama, 2005).
2 A fourth more controversial  dimension relates to  state legitimacy,
understood as the rightful exercise of power as recognized by voters.
This  component  has  often  been  considered  instrumental  to  state
capacity,  rather  than  one  of  its  essential  features  (Levi,  2002,  40).
Legitimacy  levels,  in  fact,  are  sometimes  higher  in  authoritarian
countries, as China or Azerbaijan, than in democratic ones, as France
or New Zealand (Gilley, 2006, 517). Some authors, in addition, find
that  legitimacy  rights,  operationalized  as  broad  approval  of  a
government’s rights to oblige people to pay taxes, are not related to
political  rights  (Levi  &  Sacks,  2009,  326).  We  finally  excluded
legitimacy from our operationalization of stateness, since introducing
this dimension may lead to endogeneity problems when analyzing the
democracy-stateness nexus.    
3 In line with the observations above, special attention is demanded to
researchers  to  avoid  conflating  the  ability  to  administer  from  the
services themselves and the policy choice to tax from the ability of the
state collection apparatus to collect the assessed taxes.     
4 We  exclude  other  measures  of  democracy,  for  instance  the
Mainwaring  and Brinks  index (2007),  as  these  authors  use  critical
elements of our dependent variable, such as political order, to define
the  presence  and  strength  of  democracy  in  the  area,  generating
endogeneity problems. These authors qualify Colombia (1980s to the
present) and Peru (1980s and early 1990s) as undemocratic, given the
31
government’s  and  paramilitary’s  campaigns  against  guerrillas  and
drug trafficking carried out during this period (Ibid.: 7). The measure
suggested by Huber et al. (2012) conversely, is structured around four
regimes  types  (Authoritarian  Regimes,  Bureaucratic  Authoritarian
Regimes,  Restricted  Democracies  and  Full  Democracies)  which
drastically restrict our analysis to two categories of democracy.
5 Relatively wealthy, enduring and sound democracies exhibit lower
levels of internal conflict  and are associated with lower chances to
resort to political violence (Collier & Rohner, 2008). Yet, Mansfield
and  Snyder  (2005)  argue  that  countries  in  transition  to  electoral
politics are particularly inclined to civil war,  revolution,  and ethnic
and sectarian hostility.
6 In most Latin American countries, political parties tend to be less
established  and  their  ideologies  and  electoral  pledges  less  clearly
articulated than in the industrialized West: however, experts ordered
them  into  the  same  left,  center-left,  center,  center-right,  and  right
political  spectrum, along with an additional  category of  personalist
parties (, 1997; Huber et al., 2006, 949).
7 Scholars emphasize the presence of many “lefts” in Latin America,
differentiating  between  a  programmatic  left  (as  in  Brazil,  Chile,
Uruguay) and a non-programmatic left (as in Argentina and Bolivia),
though they are not always explicit about this (Pribble, 2013; Levitsky
& Roberts, 2013; Weyland & Gates, 2011; and Cameron & Hershberg,
2010). This taxonomy is important, since it is sensible to assume that
only a programmatic left party would invest in building state capacity.
When parties are not programmatic, electors are not oriented towards
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programs in their voting, it is problematic to hold leaders responsible,
and incumbents have no motivation to translate electoral pledges into
effective  policies.  Our  operationalization  (Huber  et  al.,  2012),  is
largely in line with this distinction.
8 We assessed  the  partisan  orientation  of  government  recoding the
variable  in  the  following  way:  0  for  left  through  8  for  right
governments  (Huber  et  al.,  2006).  This  measure  has  been  labeled
“Executive Partisan Balance”. 
9  In Latin America,  a 14 years period corresponds roughly to three
presidential terms (Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 13).
10 Duration refers to the uninterrupted number of years of existing 
democratic systems, taking 1945 as the first year in our time series.  
11 Countries where oil rents are less than 10 per cent of GDP were
coded 0; and countries where oil rents are superior to 10 per cent of
GDP were coded 1.  
12 For  some,  ethnic  composition  does  not  fuel  violence  and
fragmentation  automatically;  it  does  so,  only  when  trigger  factors,
such  as  unscrupulous  leadership;  opportunistic  neighbors;  and
shattered or  growing hopes  detonate  structural  contradictions  (Gurr
1994).
13 Namely: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Haiti, Jamaica and
Suriname. The countries finally included are: Bolivia, Brazil,  Chile,
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominican Republic,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,
Guatemala,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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14 As we found some heteroskedasticity, we employed cluster-robust
standard errors, which yield a consistent VCE estimator (see Arellano,
2003; Stock &  Watson, 2008; Wooldridge, 2009).
15 In  their  classification  of  political  parties  in  the  area,  Coppedge
(1997)  and  Huber  et  al.  (2012)  distinguish  between  secular  and
Christian parties. Point 7 in Figure 7 corresponds to Christian right-
wing executives. 
16 During this period, tax collection grew slightly, by about 1 percent
(Gómez & Jiménez, 2012, 13).
17 Flores-Macias  (2014)  claims  that  security  crises  in  Colombia
provided right parties a unique window of opportunity to strengthen
tax capacity, as illustrated by president Uribe’s adoption, in 2002, of
the so-called “war tax”, which can be considered as one of Colombia’s
most important policy responses to the FARC challenge.
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